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ABSTRACT 
Patent trolls have many faces, since the media uses this expression in various ways. The 
patent troll phenomenon thus seems to be an ambiguous term that is discussed in several 
directions. This paper reveals that a patent troll as such has no distinct shape or appearance. 
Our analysis redeems a troll classification solely from firms’ market position, such as being 
non-practicing, and shows that a patent troll business can only be defined by the respective 
practice to enforce IPR. Using 10 case studies, of which five are treated in detail, the analysis 
reveals a distinct typology of IPR enforcement mechanisms and suggests a framework to 
assess the troll business. This paper is furthermore able to identify the nature of troll behavior 
to be: a) a best practice to enforce IP rights and b) a strategy that may create costs for affected 
industries. The differentiated troll analysis further reveals negative but also positive effects of 
the troll business on incentives to innovate. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Technological change and market pace have drastically increased during the past decades. 
This can especially be observed in the fields of ICT (Information and Communication 
Technologies) where product lifecycles decrease, technologies are complex and innovation is 
changing in a rapid manner. This development is a challenge for patent systems. The growing 
complexity and lack of transparency creates legal uncertainty for numerous firms. During the 
past years statistics have shown a strong concentration of patent files, which in some 
technological fields even yields to patent thickets, a web of overlapping patents that protect 
similar innovations (Shapiro, 2001). This development allows firms to peruse new strategies 
to generate revenue from IPR. In this context popular litigation cases underline a special 
bargaining position to NPE (non-practicing entities) to enforce their rights (Mergers, 2009). 
NPEs new way of enforcing IPR has brought up the rather negative term of “patent troll”.  
A patent troll is a person or entity who acquires ownership of a patent without the intention of 
actually using it to produce a product and in many cases did not actually engage in developing 
the technology (McDonough, 2006; Ohly, 2008). In most cases trolls are not inventors who 
pursue their own research, offer it for sale or provide early licenses in the process of 
innovation. They rather defend their rights against infringements. These entities – 
opportunistically or on purpose – profit from payments by companies that inadvertently 
infringe on the trolls’ intellectual property rights (Henkel & Reitzig, 2008). There is the fear 
that these in most cases small entities use courts as a mechanism to extract economic rents 
from large companies (Ball & Kesan, 2009). The term: “patent troll” is legally not 
established. It is a negative synonym used for non-manufacturing entities (NPE) and was 
popularized by the Intel Manager Peter Detkin in 2001, who used the term to describe 
TechSearch and their lawyers during a patent litigation. Other related expressions are patent 
marketer, patent dealer, patent shark or are pictured by a comparison like David vs. Goliath 
(Chien, 2009; Niro & Greenspoon, 2007). However, several literature sources criticize these 
negative associations and demand for a more specific classification of patent trolls (Geradin et 
al., 2011)    
Even though most contributions in the literature stereotype the troll business to certain 
characteristics: being non-practicing or strategically wait and hide to receive higher royalties; 
this paper analyses and evaluates ten cases to reveal heterogenic characteristics and strategies 
of patent trolls. We construct a typology of IPR enforcement and isolate a topology for patent 
trolls. Subsequently we apply our use cases to the typology and discuss specific IPR 
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enforcement strategies. We then assess whether the troll business can be beneficial or harmful 
for IPR holders, innovators or industries. Due to our specific analysis of patent troll strategies 
we are able to differentiate troll behavior and its effects. The enforcement of IPR by trolls can 
be adverse for whole industries and thus slow down innovation processes. In specific cases 
however, we reveal that the troll behavior constitutes a mechanism to disrupt anti-competitive 
behavior and thus supports innovation. 
The paper is structured as follows: we first give a review of the literature and reveal first 
implications on trolls’ business models. We secondly analyze empirical evidence from the 
current research and derive our research question.  In our empirical analysis we present our 
methodology and describe five in-depth case studies to frame our typology. We scale other 
cases to our typology and end the paper in a conclusion to deduce our policy 
recommendations. 
II THE BUSINESS MODEL: PATENT TROLL 
The troll business seems to follow a defined structure: purchase and secure patents, hide until 
the market for a certain technology develops and the patents play a considerable role and 
finally turn patents against manufacturers to obtain high royalty fees (Steiner & Guth, 2005). 
Trolls are usually solely interested in the exclusion right, not in the underlying knowledge 
(Fischer & Henkel, 2009). The patent trolls appear when the targeted product has already 
become a key or basic technology and irreversible investments have been made by the 
unaware infringer. In this lock-in situation firms are often not able to invent around or even 
stop using the technology. From an industry perspective the cost of not using the infringed 
intellectual property are (a) costs of the loss of future profits and (b) cost of investing in 
alternative technologies. These costs increase during the process of innovation along the 
phase of technology implementation. In most cases, affected companies already infringed the 
IPR when the troll states the claims. Trolls avoid the established rationales of understanding 
firms’ patent based cooperation of either exclusion or cross-licensing to co-exist (Henkel & 
Reitzig, 2008). Hence, they seem to be in a position to negotiate licensing fees that are grossly 
out of alignment with their contribution to the alleged infringer’s product or service. Their 
bargaining power tends to result in opportunistic behavior so that the troll claims excessive 
compensation (Sag & Rohde, 2006). 
In the context of standardization, strategic patent behavior has also led to contentions. The 
litigation cases of Rambus, the company that was firstly associated with the so called “patent 
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ambush” behavior, raised the attention of antitrust authorities and reinforced the political 
discussion about IP regulations concerning standards (Hovenkamp, 2008; Bensen & 
Levinson, 2009; Devlin, 2009). Patent ambush accrues when companies that participate in a 
standardization process withhold information of essential IPR and in hindsight assert that their 
patents are infringed.  
Trolls produce uncertainty for innovators and their activities may lead to royalties which are a 
multiple of what the victim, as legitimate licensee, would have been willing to pay ex-ante 
(Reitzig et al., 2007). A basic problem is the asymmetric information between trolls and 
unintentional infringers; companies often do not even know the troll´s IP exists. For the last 
decades R&D multinationals have been building up patent thickets with increasingly 
incremental inventions. It is hard to overlook those thickets because they are an overlapping 
set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain 
licenses from multiple patentees. Today’s patent trolls seem to place their bets on corporate 
carelessness or monitoring deficiency, i.e. to perform a patent research and have better 
information at an earlier stage about patents likely to be issued (Luman & Dodson, 2006). 
With multiple overlapping patents, and under a system in which patent applications are secret 
and patents slow to issue there is a major threat of hold-up problems (Shapiro, 2001).  
Patent extortion will remain a viable strategy in technologically crowded industries when 
trolls choose patents on inventions that can be invented around rather easily before 
infringement, but are sufficiently sophisticated to be upheld in court and create significant 
mid-term switching costs for manufacturers after infringement (Henkel & Reitzig, 2007). In 
contrast, patent trolls and their supporters claim that NPEs enhance innovation and 
competition by providing capital to independent inventors and creating an efficient market for 
trade in technological information (Rubin, 2007, Schmalensee, 2009; Shrestha, 2010, 
Tarantino, 2010). Policy makers have given remarkable regard to this topic (e.g. U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission, 2003; Lemley, 2007) and discuss suggestions for patent reform based on 
legal implications and empirical findings. 
There also has been a discussion in the U.S. media if universities are patent trolls. Universities 
are non-practicing-entities that share some characteristics with trolls (McDonough, 2006). 
Though, the differences are, that (a) the universities do not hide their patents and (b) most 
universities offer fair license agreements to provide valuable know-how and increase 
technology transfer (Lemley, 2007). Chien (2009) furthermore states in a more restrictive 
definition that patent trolls are entities who legally enforce their IPR. 
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III LITERATURE 
Legal methods of the troll business have been studied and researched (Magliocca, 2007; 
Golden, 2007; Lemley, 2007) but provided little empirical evidence on troll type patent 
lawsuits (Lerner, 2006; Magliocca, 2007; Reitzig et al., 2010). However, empirical evidence 
has revealed various strategies underlying the troll business and its sustainability to policy 
changes (Reitzig et al. 2007; Henkel & Reitzig, 2007, Reitzig et al. 2011). Data on litigation is 
often scarce since most infringement cases involving so called NPEs (non-practicing entities) 
do not reach court. The infringer rather settles the dispute by paying royalty fees, being afraid 
of high legal costs and lengthy litigation (Fischer & Henkel, 2009). Reitzig et al. (2007) pick 
up on the patent troll phenomenon and examine it from a theoretical perspective, 
encompassing legal, managerial, and economic aspects. The main finding is that the 
unrealistic high compensation through court ruling is the central stipulation for trolls to 
operate cost-efficient. Nevertheless, first empirical analyses have revealed that the increase in 
litigation cases was not caused by NPEs (Bessen & Meurer, 2008). Chien (2009) gives 
evidence that NPEs only caused a minority of patent suits: 17 percent of high-tech patent suits 
in the examined period. But they often name multiple defendants and sometimes, rather than 
sue, are sued, for declaratory judgment. Key finding in the study of PricewaterhouseCoopers 
is that damage awards for patent trolls are in average twice as high as those for practicing 
entities. However, NPEs have only been successful in 29 percent of the cases versus 41 
percent for practicing entities (Levko et al., 2009). Fischer & Henkel (2009) draw on a dataset 
of 565 patents acquired by known patent trolls between 1997 and 2007, and compared them to 
1,130 patents acquired by practicing firms. They could disprove the common belief that patent 
trolls focus only on minor technologies. Trolls’ patents are of significantly higher quality than 
those in the control groups. This means that the patent troll business method is sustainable in 
the long run and cannot be terminated by lifting minimum patent quality (Fischer & Henkel, 
2009). Reitzig et al. 2011 further find evidence for a transition of patent trolls acquiring or in-
licensing patents, to professional patent exploiters. The patent database of infringement 
litigation information from the Stanford Law School’s Intellectual Property Litigation 
Clearinghouse (IPLC) was evaluated in the article of Shrestha in 2010. The analysis tests 
some of the arguments made in favor and against patent trolls and determines whether these 
firms have a positive or negative effect on innovation. 
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IV METHODOLOGY 
Even though first empirical results provide insights on the trolls business, there has yet been 
no clear definition which activities qualify as troll behavior. Furthermore there has yet been 
no analysis that classifies and differentiates the appearances of the troll business. Empirical 
work has been conducted to understand the practices of patent trolls and to better evaluate 
their role in highly patent intensive markets. The goal of our article is to be more precise and 
study the distinct mechanisms of a troll’s strategy to enforce IPR.  
Table 1: Cases and interviews used in our analysis 
Cases Plaintiff 
 
Defendant 
 
Third party 
 
Papst Licensing 
GmbH & Co. KG 
 
Members of the board 
(2 Interviews) 
No Interviews 
conducted 
Non-involved attorney 
(1Interview) 
Alliacense (TPL 
group) 
 
Members of the board 
(1 Interview) 
One Affected 
company 
( 1 Interview) 
German Association 
(1 Interview) 
IP Com vs. Nokia 
 
 
Members of the board 
(2 Interviews) 
Attorney 
(1 Interview) 
Non-involved attorney 
(1 Interview) 
Sisvel S.p.A. 
 
 
Members of the board 
(1 Interview) 
Attorney 
(1 Interview) 
Non-involved attorney 
(1 Interview) 
EpicRealm 
 
 
No Interviews 
conducted 
Attorney 
(1 Interview) 
International Association 
(1 Interview) 
Amazon Inc. vs. 
Barnesandnobel 
LLC 
No Interviews 
conducted 
No Interviews 
conducted 
Non-involved attorney 
(1 Interview) 
Excel 
Communications vs. 
AT&T 
No Interviews 
conducted 
No Interviews 
conducted 
Non-involved researcher 
(1 Interview) 
NTP vs. RIM 
 
 
No Interviews 
conducted 
No Interviews 
conducted 
Non-involved attorney 
(2 Interviews) 
eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, 
L.L.C. 
No Interviews 
conducted 
No Interviews 
conducted 
Non-involved attorney 
(2 Interviews) 
HIPPO vs. 
Panasonic 
 
Affected company 
 (1 Interview) 
No Interviews 
conducted 
No Interviews 
 conducted 
 
This paper identifies 10 cases from the public media but also from non-public interviews that 
are used to illustrate a comprehensive picture of the troll phenomenon. The cases were picked 
to describe heterogenic appearances of patent trolls. In-depth analysis of five selected cases 
was conducted by interviewing all involved parties. The case study research design was 
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chosen by the aim to obtain a rich and detailed picture of patent troll behavior. We believe 
that qualitative case studies are a fruitful approach to explore specific aspects of the troll 
business (Creswell 1994; Stake 1995). The choice and performance of interviews, recording 
methods, alignment and analysis followed an interpretative case study approach (Walsham 
1993). All 15 interviews were transcribed and the use of information was permitted by all 
participants. Since all cases are very specific and allow implications in several directions, a 
standard questionnaire was used but extended by further questions on a case by case basis. If 
it was not possible to talk to both sides (plaintiff and defendant) other concerned parties were 
interviewed. In some cases we used expert knowledge of third parties to talk about several 
cases. For instance we discussed with non-involved attorneys and experts about possible 
implications of cases in the media. Thus, all cases were built upon comprehensive sources of 
information (table1). 
Using techniques and analyzing methods by Miles and Huberman (1994) we were able to 
compare, relate and classify different statements and expert estimates. We could therefore 
identify distinct patterns and themes to conduct the following case reports (Stake, 1995). 
V CASE STUDY ANALYSIS     
The commercialization and enforcement of patents is a rather complex issue which, as one 
could observe over the last years, can be practiced in many ways. Patent owners who are 
trying to enforce their claims face several alternatives. Not every commercialization of 
patents, even by companies without innovating or manufacturing activities, is an example for 
typical patent-troll behavior. There is a clear need to differentiate between various ways of 
how patent owners proceed. Our five in-depth case studies outline popular strategies and 
business activities of patent commercializing companies. 
V CASE STUDY: Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG 
The next case describes the company Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG. The case study is 
based on interviews with both owners of the German based company. Papst Licensing is a 
globally operating patent licensing company, which has dealt with property rights since 1993 
and has signed up more than 130 licensing agreements. The licensees include companies such 
as Sony, IBM, Toshiba and many other big players. There are no outside investors involved 
yet. The firm is specialized on the sectors of electrical engineering and precision engineering. 
These industries are very suitable because products in these markets often use a variety of 
patented technologies. Papst Licensing describes its activities as the detection of patent 
7 
 
infringement and thereby usually follows a common practice. The company has about 15 
employees, including patent attorneys, lawyers, engineers and economists. On the one hand 
the company searches for patent auctions in insolvency registers or the press.  On the other 
hand it also approaches medium-sized companies that want to enforce their rights. Papst 
Licensing represents mostly German companies that operate internationally and whose 
patents have already been infringed.  
In a first step Papst Licensing checks the legal characteristics of the patent. The patent has to 
be registered in a formally correct way and must not already belong to the so called state of 
the art. Afterwards, potentially infringing products are decomposed into components and 
tested in technical laboratories. Technical analysis is done by engineers; patent attorneys can 
then ascertain a possible patent infringement. In an economic evaluation procedure, products 
are later examined for their market potential and the technology for its potential degree of 
standardization. Papst Licensing refers to this as “infringement volume”. Papst Licensing 
works with external service providers, especially with patent law bureaus and market analysts 
in the respective countries.  
After this thorough assessment Papst Licensing buys the patents to have a stronger bargaining 
position in court. Papst Licensing takes over the risk of commercialization; although the 
original patent holder receives a cash sum that consists of fixed and variable components. 
Papst especially targets companies that are active in the US, due to larger markets and hence a 
higher infringement volume.  After asking infringing firms for royalty payments, they are 
threatened with injunctions in the US. About 10- 20% of all cases are taken to court. The high 
court costs and the extent of damages in American courts are effective means of exerting 
pressure to force out of court settlements.  
In the following we describe the case of Papst Licensing versus Minebea Co. Ltd in more 
detail. Minebea is a Japanese manufacturer of miniature ball bearings, which for instance can 
be found in CPU fans. The company has been active in this field since 1968. It operates 
globally with more than 49,000 employees and has its own large R&D department. Last year 
it generated sales of 2.1 billion USD. Prior to the dispute with Minebea, Papst Licensing had 
sued several major manufacturers, including IBM and Western Digital, for patent 
infringement on computer hard drives. Western Digital, for example, has paid Papst Licensing 
24 million USD for a license; the sum total of the licenses is estimated to range over 100 
million USD. In response, Minebea, which serves these manufacturers as supplier of motors, 
sued Papst Licensing for violation and abuse of license agreements. Through Papst 
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Licensing’s longtime experience in patent evaluation and enforcement in U.S. courts, the U.S. 
District Court in Washington dismissed the action of Minebea after ten years of hearings in 
2006. During trials in the US, Minebea was advocated by Welsh & Katz Ltd. law firm. 
Minebea had to drop the claims of 500 million U.S. dollars and had to pay Papst Licensing a 
compensation of 5 million Euros. 
Papst Licensing interprets this as a lawful confirmation of both its business model and 
licensing programs. 
V CASE STUDY: Alliacense (TPL group) 
The next case study describes the US company Alliacense which accused German end-
producers in the electronic and electrical industry of patent infringement. The following 
information is based on an interview with the legal division of the ZVEI (Central Association 
of Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers Germany). Alliacense is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the TPL Group, which has been active in developing, marketing and licensing of 
intellectual property rights since 1988. The TPL Group also includes the manufacturing 
company IntellaSys, which was founded in 2005 and develops and produces processor 
solutions. It is believed that the manufacturing subsidiary company was founded to counter 
accusations of the TPL Group being a patent troll.  
Alliacense holds four IP portfolios and is responsible for the management of the license 
rights. The portfolios include technologies from the vast field of electronics. It is striking that 
the patents are usually acquired through purchase or merger of the companies that have 
invented this technology. 
In the case known to us, Alliacense uses one of the four portfolios to proceed against German 
end-producers. This is the mmp-portfolio, which was named after its inventor, Charles Moore, 
a member of the board of the TPL Group. The patents protect fundamental design techniques 
for improved performance of microprocessors that are used in products of many industries 
such as mobile phones, home appliances and automotives. The mmp-portfolio includes seven 
U.S. patents as well as their German and Japanese equivalents, which are valid until 2015.  
The accused German companies are small and large system manufacturers which install these 
protected microprocessors into their devices. So far, Alliacense asked only those companies, 
which distributed their products on the American market to pay royalties. Alliacense 
specifically targets the end-producers on the downstream markets and not the microprocessor 
manufacturers. It proceeds cross-industry against infringers and communicates clearly that 
 those companies which are the first to 
their competitors. The procedure of Alliacense can be illustrated by using a simplified sketch 
of a possible value chain (graph1)
Graph1: 
The potential patent troll, in this case Alliacense, does not address the 
manufacturer, whose microprocessors infringe the patent, but the system manufacturer 
(OEM), which implements these processors in its
this strategy could firstly be due to the fact that 
from an OEM, because the processor is installed in a higher quality product. 
built-in microprocessor itself usually has a smaller value. Alliacense also uses the 
pressure from retailers and customers
to patent infringements, OEMs are not able to supply, 
terminating existing contracts.
Following a first-mover strategy by offering lower royalties, Alliacense
considerable pressure between the competitors. Similar to a prisoner’s dilemma cooperation 
i.e. everyone not paying license f
competitors. However due to risk aversion, 
first and get favorable licensing terms, one company might choose to free
license. This has the consequence that the others are urged to enter into a license agreement, 
especially if the first-mover is an influential company. This way Alliacense can build up and 
benefit from additional pressure potentials between the potential licens
Therefore, OEMs are in a position 
are grounded on patent law and
patent was not affected by the technology of the accused company. 
under such great pressure, the license 
9 
pay a license, get significant discounts compared to 
.  
troll strategy to enforce IPR in the value chain  
 devices. The reason why Alliacense chooses 
higher license fee payments can be demanded 
, since OEMs are bound to deliver their products.
retailers could threaten 
 
 
ees – would be the best strategy for all patent infringing 
pressure from retailers and the possibility to 
-ride and apply for a 
ees. 
which only allows few escape options. Allia
 are non-trivial. However, in some cases the scope of the 
Since the companies were 
was paid in many cases without further checking for
 
component 
In contrast, the 
potential of 
 If, due 
them with 
is able to build up 
– 
be the 
 
cense’s patents 
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patent claims. In such cases it is crucial to consider the particular interests of different 
departments within a company. Given an infringement charge, the legal departments first wait 
and then check carefully whether there are legal ways to bring down the patent or whether the 
patent is actually touched by the company’s technology. Sales divisions however fear the 
pressure of customers and are therefore interested in a quick solution by means of a payment. 
If the OEM does not agree with the royalty requests, Alliacense usually sues these companies 
in court. Some German companies are currently involved in litigation in the US. The OEM 
will probably try to make the component manufacturer recourse. Thus, on the one hand 
transaction costs accrue for the OEM. On the other hand, some microprocessor manufacturers 
have already passed over to withdrawing guarantees on their products being free of third party 
rights. Based on these observations it can thus be shown that for enforcing its IPR, Alliacense 
uses the bargaining power of other actors towards the final manufacturer to promote its 
interests. 
The extent of the Alliacense case against German OEMs can be illustrated by the fact that the 
ZVEI formed, at the suggestion of many affected members, a special task group. 
Representatives from affected companies, who are accused of patent infringement by 
Alliacense, are thus able to negotiate. The main purpose of this work group is the mutual 
exchange of information. Common legal steps have not yet been taken. For antitrust reasons, 
agreements and actions compelling to all members are not possible. However, political 
influence is being pursued thoroughly. As the automotive industry is also accused of 
infringement charges from Alliacense, it is thought to exchange information with the VDA 
(Association of the German Automobile Industry).  
It is expected that Alliacense will also accuse OEMs manufacturers on the German market. In 
a message from 02.02.2009, the German Patent Court in Munich confirmed the validity of a 
patent from the MMP portfolio. This suggests that Alliacense is planning to increase its 
presence on the German and European Market. 
V CASE STUDY: IP Com 
The next case study describes the Munich-based company IP Com, which describes itself as a 
patent management company. The following information is based on an interview with the 
CEO of IP Com. 
IP Com GmbH & Co KG was founded in 2007 and currently has 10 employees. They are 
highly skilled economists, engineers and legal academics. The company works with more 
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than 10 outsourced firms and employs several engineers and research agencies to conduct 
detailed market and company analysis. Funding source is the U.S. investment company 
Fortress, which currently maintains 34 billion USD. It acts as a general partner in the GmbH 
& Co KG.  
The business model of the company focuses on two groups of customers that IP Com can 
serve due to their particular market position. The activities of the company are limited to the 
management of patents; implementation or research is not part of the business model. A future 
goal is to serve the customer group of small innovative inventors and entrepreneurs. Due to 
the lack of financial resources and experience, these SME cannot enforce patented 
innovations. The big players in the market normally innovate in-house and show little interest 
in small inventors. IP Com is trying to fill this gap and communicate promising innovations to 
manufacturing companies. In this case, licensees would be enlisted which have not yet 
infringed the relevant patent. The customer group of small inventors is not yet served and it 
remains open whether this will be taken into account in the future business model. The second 
group of customers are large manufacturing companies, which are vertically integrated and 
often possess unused patent portfolios. Some big companies cannot use their patents as a 
result of specific market structures. In this context, vertically integrated players often conduct 
so called silent cross-licensing agreements, where IPR is mutually used without paying 
royalties. Due to powerful market positions of large companies, these market-sharing 
strategies are not equally divided. Being a non-innovating and non-producing company, IP 
Com buys these unused patents in order to enforce them profitably. Since IP Com is not active 
in the market, it is not vulnerable to attack or blackmail by market power. The ownership 
transfer of patents from vertically integrated companies to IP Com enables IP Com to take 
advantage of its market position concerning the license requirement. 
In 2007, IP Com purchased a patent portfolio of Bosch GmbH for an unknown amount. The 
portfolio consists of over 1,000 patents in the mobile communication area. One fourth of these 
patents are standardized wireless technologies like GMS, GPRS or UMTS. These patents are 
essential to widely adopted standards in the industry and are used by almost all market 
participants in the mobile sector. The patents are all registered in Europe and 50% of them in 
the most relevant markets such as in the U.S., Japan, China and Korea. 
Bosch developed this patent portfolio between 1983 and 2000 and was, in these early stages 
of mobile technology, seen as a pioneer. Bosch was involved in the development of 
transmission standards and has sat in many standardization committees. For the development 
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of these innovations Bosch spent an estimated 8 billion EUR. Bosch was only operational in 
the mobile industry until 2000, then selling its mobile sector to the Siemens AG. However, 
Bosch retained the patents, since it was difficult to assess patents on their economic benefits 
at this time and Siemens could not make an acceptable offer. Because Bosch had turned away 
from the mobile communication industry, it tried to exploit the unused patents and requested 
licenses. In this context, especially Nokia had used many of the innovations concerned. Bosch 
however was not able to get Nokia to pay license fees. Nokia threatened Bosch with counter 
lawsuits, and even with the cancellation of computer chip orders. For Bosch, Nokia is an 
important customer and thus, Bosch had no economically lucrative ways to enforce their 
patents. In 2007 it was decided to sell the portfolio, but Nokia was not interested in buying it 
at that time. It is believed that Nokia expected to sell to another market participant. During 
that time Nokia held a market share of around 40% and was by far the strongest player in the 
market. This market power could have helped Nokia not pay any licenses, like with Bosch. 
The purchase by IP Com was a surprise to Nokia. 
Since the acquisition of the patent portfolio, IP Com is enforcing these patents worldwide. 
The procedure follows a very professional strategy. In a first step, the patents are legally 
examined with the help of the attorney office Frohwitter Munich. The second step is an 
economic assessment. About 35 out of 160 patent families could be identified as essential 
patents to communication standards. Therefore the whole market volume in the 
telecommunication sector reflects the value of the patents. Violation of the remaining patents 
is determined by using engineer consultants. The relevant mobile devices are set apart and 
examined very carefully in their individual components. 
The second phase is technical negotiation with the infringing companies. IP Com meets 
worldwide in San Francisco, Tokyo and Seoul with the engineers of the companies to 
introduce the patents. All information about the patents in question is disclosed so that the 
affected companies have an accurate picture of the scope, duration or even counter-patents. 
Usually, the technical negotiations do not exceed three to five meetings. From this point on, 
commercial negotiation begins. IP Com conducts previous thorough research in order to know 
about all business activities of the respective company. This is done by so- called research 
offices, mandated by IP Com, which claim to be reading up to 160 analysts’ reports per week. 
Main focus is to determine the future strategy of the infringing companies and thus observe 
their activities in each country accurately. Therefore, relevant markets are constantly 
monitored, to be able to enforce license payments effectively after market entries. If the 
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commercial negotiations, however, run unsuccessfully, IP Com has to assert its intellectual 
property rights by legal action. Probably the best known litigation case in the media is Nokia 
versus IP Com.  
After the purchase of the patent portfolio, IP Com tried to agree on a royalty payment with 
Nokia. However, Nokia was not willing to pay so IP Com had to enforce its patent rights. It is 
particularly interesting, that for the first time the amount of the royalty was negotiated- in 
court. Courts often only decide on the finding of a patent infringement. For cost reasons, the 
license amount is usually negotiated out of court.  
The case with Nokia is currently being heard at the patent courts in Mannheim and 
Dusseldorf.  For determining the amount of the license right, there are two methods of 
calculation. Firstly, IP Com can present a report prepared by Nokia themselves, by which one 
can calculate licenses due to the importance of the patents for the whole product. This report 
was commissioned by Nokia in an earlier case where Nokia was the plaintiff. This report 
states that one can demand 1-1.5% revenue share per essential patent. The calculation flattens 
towards the top, because of the added value. At 4 to 5 infringed and essential patents one can 
demand a revenue share of approximately 4-5%. In the Nokia case one can thus calculate an 
amount of 12 billion EUR. But Nokia did not agree with its own calculation model and 
pleaded for distortion of competition. Secondly, the two patent courts will determine a 
FRAND3 (Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminating) license. This form of royalty calculation 
is used particularly in industries and sectors with universal technology standards that are used 
by all market participants. A license determination can thus be uniformly established for 
essential patents on standards. "Fair" is to ensure that the license does not support competitive 
dominance of a market participant. "Reasonable" is aimed at a proportionate license, which 
especially considers the importance of the patent for the whole product. "Non-
Discriminatory" stands for equal treatment of each licensee. Especially the term reasonable is 
criticized to be a rather vague definition (Rysman & Simcoe, 2007). 
The lawsuit will still be running for at least one or two years until an accurate determination 
of the license is complete. It costs several million USD per month. With a positive court 
decision, IP Com expects other infringing companies to accept the amount of a FRAND 
license too.  
                                                           
3
 As a member of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”), Bosch took part in the GSM 
and UMTS (WCDMA) standard setting processes and therefore granted irrevocable licenses under FRAND 
conditions. IP Com confirmed to the EU Commission to take over Bosch’s previous commitment to grant 
irrevocable licenses on FRAND terms. 
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V CASE STUDY: Sisvel S.p.A. 
Sisvel S.p.A. is an Italian based company that started as a manufacturer of televisions in 1982 
and has dealt with IPR since 1986. Sisvel also acts as a patent pool administrator e.g. for the 
MPEG audio patent pool and is currently planning a patent pool for LTE technologies. Sisvel 
focuses on the entertainment industry and holds a portfolio of almost 500 patents. Major 
clients including firms like Phillips, Apple or Creative Labs, have outsourced their patent 
commercialization activities to Sisvel. The firm became famous for pushing the claims on a 
patent on a volume bar in TV sets, which visually increases according to the sound volume.  
For several years, Sisvel manages IPR for MP3- and MPEG4-technologies among companies 
such as France TeleCom, Telediffusion De France, Philips Electronics and the Institut für 
Rundfunktechnik (IRT). The following case shows how Sisvel proceeds to enforce and 
effectively license those patents. Information is based on an interview with two Clifford 
Chance attorneys who worked for the defendants and thus revealed detailed information about 
the case. Due to data protection reasons both attorneys could only give some names of the 
companies involved. The case study particularly stresses the strategies used to commercialize 
patents and shows how licensees are being coerced to fulfill immediate and high payments. 
Some days prior to the CeBIT 2008 fair in Hanover, Sisvel S.p.A. sent requests for license 
payments to more than 40 exhibitors. Requests were up to a three-digit-million USD range 
and could therefore not be incurred immediately. Since IPR infringement is a crime in 
Germany, Sisvel was able to sue nearly 40 electronics manufacturers. As a consequence, more 
than 200 constables confiscated products like MP3-players, DVD-players with MP3 function, 
GPS devices and mobile phones at the CeBIT in 2008. The accused firms are large 
manufacturers like Sagem or Hyundai. Several of the affected firms are from Asian countries. 
In the course of this incident the respective firms were termed as product pirates in the media, 
which, especially due to their Asian origin, damaged their image rigorously. Moreover, the 
prosecution not only accused the corporate body but also the responsible executives, since 
infringement is also a crime in civil law. 
According to German law, firstly the patent infringement has to be ascertained and in a 
second step the license fees are set. The infringing firms were aware of the validity of the 
patents because of earlier paid royalties and the disclosure of the IPR portfolios of Sisvel. 
Thus, the trial was not even started, since the situation seemed to be clear. Due to public 
pressure and the accusation by the prosecutor of Lower Saxony, it came to a swift out of court 
settlement which committed the offending companies to pay licensing fees. Patent 
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infringement claims are usually not held in civil courts. The strategy of suing executives 
personally for up to 5 years imprisonment has to be examined with regard to the 
proportionality of the situation. Although the violation of property rights is a crime, the civil 
prosecution has not been pursuing patent infringement claims so far. Accusing the violating 
companies at the time of the Hanover exhibition resulted in two important strategic 
advantages for Sisvel. First, it is very difficult to get an injunction in Asia and court 
procedures are lengthy and complicated. The location advantage of Germany and the legal 
context are important foundations for the effective enforcement of property rights. Another 
advantage is the use of the press as a pressurizing medium. The CeBIT is the largest IT fair in 
the world and the seizure of the stands imposed public pressure on the respective firms. The 
affected companies operate globally and have their own large R&D departments. The 
presentation as product pirates in the press is therefore strongly damaging the firm’s image. 
The measure of accusation in Germany and the public pressure during the CeBIT had created 
a strong negotiating position for Sisvel. They were thus able to force the infringing companies 
to pay licensing fees in a very effective and quick manner. Sivels activities to enforce their 
rights can be classified as so called “forum shopping”, a strategy of litigants that choose a 
court in a most preferable country or district. 
V CASE STUDY: EpicRealm 
The next case deals with the American based company EpicRealm Licensing which is a 
medium-sized company that can be considered as being a pioneer in dynamic content delivery 
for web pages. This technology was one of the first to permit up-to-the-second content 
delivery. The following case was constructed after an interview with the executive director of 
PUBPAT, a non-profit organization which has the mission to protect freedom in the US patent 
system.  
In the years of 1996 and 1999 the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) granted two 
website patents of EpicRealm. The protected technology was a program code for the dynamic 
construction of web pages that was used by almost all companies that provided websites that 
can produce custom responses to individual visitors or users. In the beginning of 2005 
EpicRealm sued more than a dozen online players, including matchmaking sites such as 
eHarmony.com and Friendfinder.com, day-planner specialist FranklinCovey, weight-loss drug 
company Herbalife, and automobile-glass repair company SafeLite. All of these companies 
can be considers as being rather small, since EpicRealm feared attacking the big players. But 
the SafeLite case had a surprising dimension, as Safelite is an “Oracle e-Business Suite” 
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customer. Oracle is a much bigger target, one with a bigger wallet and more at stake and the 
“Oracle e-Business Suite” is used in conjunction with the delivery of dynamic web pages. 
EpicRealm did not accuse Oracle in the first place, but attacked its customers that used the 
technology without paying royalties. This is a new way of attacking the big players. Oracle 
was not only under pressure because they are infringing a patent, but they were accused by 
their own customers. This is a big issue especially when taking into account Oracle’s 
reputation and customer relationship. Oracle had to face reduced credibility, damage that can 
cause immeasurable costs. The suits were filed in the U.S. District Court of the Eastern 
District of Texas, which has a reputation for being friendlier towards patent holders.  
EpicRealm's aggressive assertion caused substantial public harm by threatening the way in 
which most useful aspects of the web were provided to the public. PUBPAT, a legal group 
whose directors include free and open-source software advocates, heard about this case and 
tried to challenge these patents. In 2006 PUBPAT filed a request to the USPTO, which argued 
that the PTO was not aware of existing prior art technology when it granted the two patents to 
EpicRealm in 1996 and 1999. PUBPAT found that IBM also applied for a patent in 1995 that 
covers a method of fulfilling requests of a web browser. In the end the PTO granted the 
request made by PUBPAT and reviewed the two patents held by EpicRealm. In theory, the re-
examination process should have taken several months, but in reality it often takes years. 
Oracle feared  losing  customers  during the time the case was not solved and might decide to 
pay the patent license right away next time since the costs of fighting trolls are not only 
monetary.     
VI TYPOLOGY: IPR enforcing companies 
To better understand companies’ different approaches to enforce their IPR, we constructed a 
typology identifying which behavior can be considered as a troll business. We believe that a 
classification only needs to take into account the companies’ activities concerning the 
respective IPR. We assume that a manufacturer who owns a patent but has no intention of 
producing it and therefore might even operate in a different market, has a comparable position 
to non-practicing entities. We furthermore assume that the main goal of the patent owner is 
the income through royalties. We especially consider activities of non-producing and non-
innovating companies, which are classified in a sub-typology of patent trolls. 
Graph 2 illustrates the typology of IPR enforcing companies to distinctly identify the troll 
business model. In the columns we distinguish between the use of trivial and non-trivial 
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patents. In the lines, the classification distinguishes between combinations of innovating / 
non-innovating and producing / non-producing; based on the activities of the patent owner 
concerning the patent. It is thus possible that companies with several patents and therefore 
several activities can be classified in different typologies. The characteristic “producing" 
implies the technical implementation of the technology or the intention to do so in the future. 
The characteristic "innovating" stands for the independent innovation of the patented 
technology. We condense two appearances of the classification of a patent to be trivial. Firstly 
we understand a trivial patent to be of trivial technological input and which should have never 
been accepted by the regarded patent office. Secondly we also consider a patent to be trivial in 
a specific case were the patent might be of sufficient quality but does not affect the infringers 
technology that is in question. 
Graph2: typology of IPR enforcing companies  
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Attributes in italics reflect the motivation and reason for the company to enforce their IPR: 
The technology-blocker tries to defend its technologies from imitation. The manufacturing 
and innovating company’s main goal is to protect its market share and block its competitors. 
In most cases these companies would probably prohibit the use of the protected technology. 
However, in some cases, when the technology is essential to a standardized technology, the 
company has to declare the patent to be licensed und FRAND4 terms. Examples for these 
                                                           
4
 Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory 
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companies are usually medium-sized or big companies such as IBM, Siemens, Nokia or 
Motorola or small companies that operate in niche markets. 
The trivial technology-blocker owns IPR on technologies which are already state of the art 
and therefore do not contain a new technological step. Such trivial patents are enforced in 
order to gain market share or protect entire markets. Since especially trivial patents may cover 
a wide range of constructive technologies, whole industries can be blocked or forced to pay 
royalty fees. 
In practice, there are several case examples of companies that tried to enforce trivial patents. 
The following cases are briefly presented in order to illustrate this type of IPR enforcement. 
The first case concerns the company Amazon.Com Inc., which filed the so-called "1-Click" 
patent in 1999 at the USPTO. This patent protects the function of storing customer 
information, for repeated on-line purchase. The direct competitor Barnesandnobel.Com LLC 
used the same technique of customer data storage for the web based purchase of books. 
Amazon moved for an injunction to omit the usage of the “1-Click” technology. In parallel 
the USPTO initiated a repeated evaluation of the patent but still grants it as valid. The 
European Patent Office in contrast reviewed the patent and rejected it in 2007.  
Another case discusses the American telecommunications giant AT&T which received a 
patent in1994 for a billing systems that can be used in voice mail messages. The patent 
protects the function to differentiate between long-distance and short-distance calls and 
thereupon adjusting the billing system. The competing company Excel Communications used 
the same accounting technique and was therefore sued for an injunction. However, the District 
Court of Della Ware identified the patent as being invalid. 
The patent-enforcer does not want to produce the innovated technology, but still 
economically enforce its IPR to compensate for efforts and investments in innovation. These 
companies usually sell or license their IPR. A blocking strategy is usually not pursued since 
these non-practicing entities do not operate in downstream markets.  Exemplary companies 
are Qualcomm or Inter Digital. Individual inventors can also be classified as patent-enforcers. 
These inventors have in most cases not the capacities to produce the invention themselves. 
Thus inventors need to cooperate with manufacturing companies. Multinational firms only 
have internal research and development departments and do not accept external contributions. 
In the case of the HIPPO invention, a team of University researchers invented a clinical horse 
to cure back pain. They filed a PCT patent application PCT/DE97/00255 in 1997 but failed to 
find sufficient investors to produce their invention. In 2007 Panasonic launched the “Core 
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Trainer” a product that apparently made use of the HIPPO technologies. HIPPO then pursued 
efforts to enforce their IPR (Ann, 2009). 
Another case is about MercExchange, a company that tried to enforce a patent covering the 
“Buy it now” function of eBay in 2003. MercExchange did not practice the patented invention 
itself, but the Virginia jury trail adjudged eBay to willfully infringe the patent. In the 
following verdict the District Court however denied an injunction. In 2006 the Supreme Court 
of the United States determined that an injunction cannot automatically be issued when the 
infringement is proved. The outcome was especially addressed to non-practicing entities and 
thus drastically decreased the leverage potential of an injunction to enforce IPR of non-
practitioners (Diessel, 2007). 
The trivial patent-enforcer is in most cases a small innovative company or individual. The 
inventions are not current state of the art and do not contain ac new technological step. In 
other cases the IPR does not sufficiently affect the technology of the infringer. Nevertheless, 
granted patents can be enforced under the cloak of innovative technologies. The aim is mainly 
to receive royalties using the pressure of injunction. As the patents are not legally valid, 
judicial processes are usually avoided. The licensees are in most cases not aware of the patent 
quality, or simply not able to afford litigation financially.  
A good example is the EpicRealm case which was discussed before. Another case is about 
NTP a one man company that became famous by suing RIM. However, the intended 
injunction on a technology that would have omitted the use of all Blackberry smart phones in 
North America was not approved by the court. In later cases NTP also sued Palm for 
infringement, but patents were re-examined by the PTO and identified as being prior art.  
The patent-implementer uses the technology for its products without pursuing the effort of 
invention. For this purpose, companies can either purchase a license or buy the patent. Widely 
adopted technological standards such as GSM, UMTS, MPEG or the IEEE 802 standards are 
protected by thousands of patents belonging to a various number of patent owners (Pohlmann 
& Blind, 2010; Baron & Pohlmann, 2011). Most innovative products build upon these 
standards and therefore even highly innovative firms may pay licenses to others. 
The trivial patent-implementer is a company that buys trivial patents or pays royalties to 
trivial patent owners. These companies are not aware of the missing quality of these patents, 
or are simply not in the financial position to fight in litigation cases. In some cases the 
plaintiff’s patents do not even affect the technology of the accused infringer. Affected 
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companies lack of knowhow and financial resources to prove these claims. It is in most cases 
cheaper and especially less risky to blindly pay royalty fees. 
VII TYPOLOGY: The patent troll business 
Graph 2 illustrates the typology of IPR enforcing companies. Since we need to pay special 
attention to non-manufacturing and non-innovating firms we classify them in a sub typology 
of patent trolls (graph 3). We are thus able to differentiate cases where the licensee has 
formerly infringed or is initially buying a license and we furthermore divide into extortive and 
fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory IPR enforcement. The latter categories are divided by 
the leverage potential of the licensor. We study our cases and derive characteristics such as 
asymmetric information, legal uncertainty, high court fees and time pressure due to media 
attention, pressure from downstream markets and retailers and pressure from competitors. Our 
case studies show that the pursued approaches to enforce IPR may differ among the patents of 
one company. We therefore categorize the different enforcing activities of one firm to several 
classifications in our typology. 
We learned from the case studies, that even though the so called “patent trolls” are all non-
manufacturing and non-innovating, activities in enforcing their IPR differ from case to case. 
In our analysis we precisely value and categorize the troll’s activities to show that a) the troll 
business can be a best practice to enforce IPR and b) troll activities may cause excessive 
royalties or excessive litigation costs. 
We firstly differentiate two types of licensees, one that has already infringed and one that can 
choose to buy a license. The latter case of a license supplier has yet been discussed very 
sparsely in literature and there is little knowledge about how reasonable such situations are in 
practice. Learning from our five cases, we can at least conclude that IP Com and Papst 
Licensing pursue businesses where they offer innovative IPR to manufacturers ex ante. 
Especially in the context of standard setting, we have evidence that trolls can extort 
companies to pay royalties even though they have not infringed the patent yet (license 
extortionist). When technological standards are widely adopted, companies have to 
implement this technology in order to ensure interoperability among other products or 
applications. However, most standard bodies or standard consortia use F/RAND licensing 
terms, which is a binding commitment for essential patent holders to license under fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminating terms (Rysman & Simcoe, 2007; Salant, 2007).   
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Graph3: typology of patent trolls 
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post IPR enforcement of known patents as royalty claimants. 
Certain market constellation may prevent IPR enforcement by patent owning companies or 
individuals (Bosch, SMEs in the Papst case, SMEs in the Alliacense case) since they posses 
no means to exert pressure on infringers. The use cases of Papst Licenses, Alliacense, IP Com 
and Sisvel have shown that the patent troll business can be a best practice to enforce IPR and 
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they were either too small or too dependent, e.g. a supplier that relies on the manufacturer’s 
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incentives to innovate and prevent a socially optimal level of innovation activities (Diessel, 
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these companies serve or even acquire SMEs and enforce their IPR ex post technology 
adoption to demand higher fees. The Sisvel and EpicRealm cases further reveal specific 
strategies how patent trolls are able to use public media and infringers fear of bad reputation 
to extort excessive royalties. Especially the case of Sisvel and PapstLicensing revealed a 
common practice called “forum shopping”, where the plaintiff strategically chooses a certain 
court in a certain country or district that might allow a more favorable judgment.  The 
Alliacense case illustrated tactics such as first mover pricing discounts or suits on OEMs to 
increase the pressure and boost royalty amounts for infringers. This behavior classifies the 
companies of our cases as excessive royalty extortionists. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
The phenomenon of patent trolls is often considered as being overrated, but has still caused 
significant litigation cases and therefore drawn the attention of economic research. This paper 
is the first to provide evidence of specific patent troll strategies and methods to enforce IPR. 
We are able to precisely exemplify a patent trolls approach to identify infringement, conduct 
technological tests, estimate the market share and then pursue optimal enforcement tactics. 
We thus find evidence for a new professional business model that might still incorporate risks 
(Bessen and Meurer, 2008), but minimizes the failure margin by a diverse set of enforcement 
strategies.  
As to our typology we believe all trivial patent cases to have negative effects on technology 
markets. Therefore we urge patent authorities not only to increase the quality of patent files 
but also to more precisely delimit possible patent claims. We show that patents of good 
quality may also harm affected companies who are not aware that their technologies do not 
infringe the accused claims. These information asymmetries especially apply for small and 
medium size companies, which lack of financial resources to screen the patent landscape. 
These cases are often not public and small companies have no means and lobby to push this 
topic. USA based SMEs are able to apply court fee reduction to decrease legal costs. We 
support these regulations to balance legal power among firms and further suggest efforts to 
increase transparency and ensure legal certainty. 
Our use cases show that good quality patents which are verifiably infringed should in most 
cases be enforced to sustain incentives to innovate. However, we especially pay attention to 
patent holders which are non-producing and non-innovating and further differentiate four 
categories. We reject the common believe that these firms by default decrease incentives to 
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invest in innovation even though they are not innovative themselves. When comparing our 
use cases to our typology we find evidence that depending on the timing of enforcement and 
the leverage potential of the plaintiff, only one category of on-producers and non-innovators 
may cause negative effects. We call these firms excessive royalty extortionists, since they 
extort licenses due to their leverage potential. This leads to excessive royalty fees or lengthy 
litigation. However, we show that firms which offer their IPR ex ante to be licensed or even 
disclose IPR ex post but do not exploit their market position, might increase incentives to 
innovate. IPR owners who are not able to enforce their IPR can sell their patents to new 
interconnected markets, for instance the patent trolls. This allows enforcement by no-
practitioners where royalty rates are only dependent on the patent quality and claims, but 
independent from other market dependencies. The analysis of our five use cases and the 
typology of patent trolls can be used to answer both of our research questions. We believe that 
our case study provides evidence that the patent troll business is able to break open 
unbalanced market constellations. A patent troll is not vertically integrated and not active on 
product markets and therefore has a certain bargaining position. Patent owning companies are 
in many cases either too small or too dependent on other market participants to enforce their 
IPR. We conclude that the patent troll business can be a best practice to enforce IPR. In line 
with the literature we find that the existence of non-practicing-entities in competing 
technology markets may disrupt anti-competitive behavior and thus even increase innovative 
contributions (Diessel, 2007; Schmalensee, 2009; Tarantino, 2010; Geradin et al., 2011). 
Especially in the case of Bosch, IPR is now licensed that has been used since decades without 
the payment of royalties. Cross-licensing solutions have to been seen critical in cases of 
asymmetric market dependencies. Patent trolls may thus even cure the system to enforce 
rights and increase incentives to innovate for weak or dependant market participants who sell 
their patents (e.g. Bosch, HIPPO, SMEs in the PapstLicensing case, SMEs in the Alliacense 
case). Without the possibility to enforce IPR these companies might undervalue returns from 
IPR. This might prevent a socially optimal level of future investments in R&D (Diessel, 
2009). However, we believe that patent trolls create additional costs, e.g. evaluation, 
negotiation and litigation costs, compared to cross-license agreements. These costs might thus 
be rediscounted by higher royalty fees. Even though patent trolls generate these costs, we still 
believe that some cases have proven the patent troll business to be beneficial for the patent 
system and IPR enforcement. Other literature contributions further stress that the influence of 
vertical integration on royalty rates is ambiguous. Manufacturing firms may have the same 
means to request excessive royalties, for instance to new market entrants or vertically non 
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integrated firms (Layne-Farrar & Schmidt, 2010). 
However, we also find evidence for our second question and find proof from our cases that 
patent trolls’ strategies to enforce IPR may also lead to excessive royalty fees and increasing 
negotiation costs. We identified leverage methods such as influence on infringers’ image 
through the media (Sisvel, EpicRealm), forum shopping (Sisvel, Alliances, PapstLicensing, IP 
COM), first mover incentives to take early licenses, pressure by accusing OEMs, retailers, 
consumers and executives (Alliances, Sisvel) and the move to sue injunctions (Sisvel, 
Alliances, PapstLicensing, IPCom). These methods combined with an uncertainty about the 
patent scope and qualities often yielded excessive royalties, lengthy negotiation and costly 
litigation. However, most of these strategies just exploit faults of the patent system such as 
heterogenic legislation among countries, non-transparency of the patent system, filing of 
trivial patents, unjustified broad patent claims, unjustified injunctions and a general legal 
uncertainty due to legislation that draws on proportionality principles. 
This paper constructs a distinct typology of IPR enforcing companies and in particular of 
patent trolls. Future cases in the context of IPR infringement can be classified by applying our 
framework and typology. Policymakers, business leaders and innovators are hence able to 
assess the troll business and anticipate its possible effects. Even though we only analyze ten 
patent troll cases, we believe that our empirical results are able to add value to findings in the 
literature and that our typology can be applied to a various number of cases. We are further 
able to differentiate possible effects of the patent troll business, which might still be diverse 
but easier to assess when applying our findings. 
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